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Preface 
Hundreds or even thousands of international legal instruments on "the environment" 
are in existence. What happens to international environmental agreements once they are 
signed, and how does the process of implementing such agreements influence their 
effectiveness? These are the questions that motivate the IIASA project "Implementation 
and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments (IEC)". Research teams 
are examining these questions from many angles and with different methods. 
In this paper, Vladimir Kotov examines the ways in which international 
environmental agreements are implemented in the former Soviet Union, especially Russia. 
The massive transformation under way in the former command economies poses 
interesting questions and many difficulties for scholars. Transformation affects behavior 
in all sectors of the society, and implementation of international environmental 
agreements is also intended to affect behavior. How can scholars disentangle the 
influences on behavior due to transformation and those due to implementation of 
international environmental agreements? Kotov examines the major elements of the 
transformation under way in Russia and focusses on how implementation of international 
environmental agreements might affect and be affected by the transformation. In doing 
so, he lays one foundation for disaggregating these different influences on behavior. 
Transformation is marked by the relative absence of planning and implementation 
because the old system of commands has collapsed and a new system has not yet 
effectively emerged. A major challenge for the new system is to manage the 
decentralization of authority and decision-making that accompanies the organization of 
society around markets rather than commands. Kotov notes that during the 
transformation process much more of the activity and policy planning that is relevant for 
implementation of international environmental agreements now takes place at the local 
level. Direct implementation of plans and standards has decreased markedly; the role of 
negotiation has increased, leading to widely varied outcomes. Under the command 
system, when the planning process was mobilized to implement an agreement, 
implementation was easier. Many decisions made during the transformation period will 
have long-term consequences for the implementation of international environmental 
agreements. Among these are choices about distribution and control over property rights. 
The IEC project is now sponsoring several in-depth case studies--notably on the 
European acid rain agreement (including a study of implementing acid rain controls on 
the Kola Peninsula) and the agreements to control pollution in the Baltic Sea. Those 
empirical studies employ some of the concepts and questions elaborated in this paper. 
The context of this paper in the IEC project 
This paper is one of several IEC working papers that survey the existing literature, 
place the project in a framework of prior research, and identify the major questions that 
deserve further study. At the outset, members of the project decided to prepare these 
papers to ensure that we were adequately aware of other research in the field and, 
especially, to ensure that we would be studying the most important questions in the 
proper context. The papers that play these roles are listed below, divided into each of the 
three areas of IEC's research program. Fuller descriptions of different parts of IEC's 
research program are available in the IEC project description (copies available from IEC) 
and in the prefaces and working papers listed below. 
1. Historical case-study and comparative research 
Most of IEC's research is directed at studying how international environmental 
agreements have been implemented historically through examination of case- 
studies and focussed comparisons among selected cases. Teams are studying 
domestic implementation as well as international and transnational processes. 
Eight papers review the relevant literature and establish the context and 
research questions: 
Research on implementation at the domestic level in Western Europe and 
in the Eastern economies undergoing transformation: 
o Steinar Andresen, Jon Birger Skjarseth, and Jmgen Wettestad, 
1994, "Regime, the State and Society--Analysing the 
Implementation of International Environmental Commitments". 
o Vladimir Kotov, 1994, "Implementation and Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Regimes During the Process of 
Economic Transformation in Russia". 
o Elena Nikitina, 1994, "Domestic Implementation of International 
Environmental Commitments: a Review of Soviet Literature". 
o Alexei Roginko, 1994, "Domestic Compliance with International 
Environmental Agreements: a Review of Current Literature". 
Research on international and transnational processes of implementation: 
o David G. Victor with Owen J. Greene, John Lanchbery, Juan 
Carlos di Primio and Anna Korula, 1994, "Roles of Review 
Mechanisms in the Effective Implementation of International 
Environmental Agreements". 
o David G. Victor, John Lanchbery and Owen Greene, 1994, "An 
Empirical Study of Review Mechanisms: Report on Work in 
Progress". 
o David G. Victor with Anna Korula, 1994, "What Is an 
International Environmental Agreement?" 
o Owen J. Greene, 1994, "On Verifiability, and How It Could 
Matter for International Environmental Agreements". 
2. Development of a database 
IEC is developing a database that will consist of key variables related to the 
development and effective implementation of international agreements. It will 
allow systematic use of historical evidence from a large number of cases. The 
goal is to make possible the testing of hypotheses and the drawing of general 
conclusions about which variables are causally linked to "effectiveness". One 
paper reviews the major hypotheses related to the formation and effectiveness 
of international regimes: 
o Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Ziirn, 1994, "The 
Study of International Regimes". 
3. Other research and policy activities 
IEC researchers are applying their research findings to current and future 
policy issues as opportunities arise. The project is also sponsoring a major 
simulation-gaming exercise to explore issues of institutional design, 
implementation and compliance in international environmental agreements. 
Simulations can help promote creative thinking about political options for 
international management of climate change, identify potential pitfalls, 
integrate policy-relevant knowledge from a variety of domains, and identify 
important policy-relevant knowledge needs. One paper surveys the benefits of 
using simulation-gaming as a policy and research tool: 
o Edward A. Parson, 1995, "Why Study Hard Policy Problems With 
Simulation-Gaming?" 
The above list includes only the papers that the project has used in establishing the 
frQmework for its research activities. A complete list of publications and copies of papers 
are available from the IEC ofices at ILASA. 
Executive Summary 
A major feature of the massive transformation underway in the former communist 
economies is the atomization of power. Former command economies are giving way to 
markets; decisions formerly made and implemented by the center are now dispersed. The 
new market-oriented economy will coalesce around new institutions, ideas, interests, 
behaviors, and means of influence. In the interim, transformation obviously affects 
virtually all aspects of life, including how international environmental agreements are 
implemented. 
This paper outlines the major elements of the transformation in Russia and their 
potential consequences for the implementation and effectiveness of international 
environmental agreements. When compared with the relatively stable countries of 
Western Europe, it is hardly clear whether systematic analysis of the implementation of 
international environmental agreements in the context of massive transformation is 
possible. However, an informed awareness of the issues at stake is clearly very important 
given Russia's large size and relevance to the effective management of many international 
environmental problems. This paper offers one starting point for empirical research that 
is now underway. It is intended as an exploration of the major questions that will arise 
and should be addressed in such research. Other transformations in the former command 
economies have taken different paths; careful research on the Russian situation can be 
used in comparisons with other economies to further reveal the aspects and decisions that 
characterize the different transformations. 
Economic and political transformation in Russia is marked by eight types of change: 
1) Actors. Some actors are entirely disappearing from political influence--such as 
Gosplan, the Russian State Planning Committee. Others are relatively new, such as 
foreign-owned companies. For the first time, fully fledged private enterprises, 
banks, trading companies, investment funds are present in Russia. In addition, new 
institutions have been formed, notably stock and commodity exchanges and the 
market itself. Privatization is changing ownership of key polluting industries--away 
from the state to shareholders and workers--resulting in changes in property rights 
and the locus of decision-making. Changes in government actors include the 
creation of the Ministry of the Environment (1992), which is implementing the 
wholly new Environmental Law (1 99 1). 
2) System linkages. The command economy was linked vertically, with tight 
connection to the center; the market system is linked horizontally, with decisions 
originating and flowing from market signals. In practice, the move from vertical to 
horizontal systems has not been accompanied by a complete change in governmental 
institutions that manage linkages--notably, interdepartmental planning commissions, 
vestiges of command planning and implementation, still exist. New institutions and 
practices are sometimes built on top of the old. 
3) Interests. Under the command system, officially it was legitimate to express 
only the interests of the state, although in practice they reflected the ambitions of 
the narrow group, the nomenclarura. In the transition to the market system the 
expression of private interests is both legitimate and encouraged--the collective 
interest is presumed to be an aggregation of private interests expressed through 
market decisions. 
4) Environmental priorities. Under the Soviet system the negotiation and 
implementation of international environmental agreements was motivated by the 
pursuit of other international political goals, for example to offset tough Soviet 
stances on other issues such as human rights. Beginning with the political 
liberalization of perestroika the pursuit of environmental protection has become a 
legitimate interest in its own right. Changes in priorities and interests may also 
affect how the new Russian state views the obligations and treaties to which it is 
now the successor of the Soviet Union. 
5) Regions. The shift from a centralized to a federal system has led some to hope 
that environmental protection would be more effective when implemented by 
(perhaps more influential) regional and local authorities. Whether this will occur 
remains to be seen. 
6) Nature of economic development. The shock of transformation oppressively 
affects economic development, hopefully only for a short transition period as the 
new economic system is built. Sharp decreases in production, aging of 
technologies, and the dismantling of productive capacities are all abundant. 
7) Military complex. The military was both one of the largest polluters under the 
old system, and one of the most powerful institutions. It freely violated the norms 
of international environmental agreements when that met its interests. The roles and 
power of the military in the new system are unclear, but if transformation 
diminishes the power and increases transparency of military activities then that may 
improve the prospects for implementing international environmental agreements. 
8) Behavior. The purpose of enumerating these elements of the transformation 
process is to allow explanations of how behavior might change. However, in 
addition to direct changes in behavior, the transformation process also results in 
wholly new forms of acceptable behavior, and these new forms also constrain and 
feedback on behavior. Under the totalitarian system, independent behavior was 
punished whereas the new system tolerates independence. Because the command 
system could not contemplate that actual behavior would be different from the 
command, it was (and is) particularly difficult to distinguish real behavioral change 
from what the command system ascribed as behavioral change. Further, the 
command system's control over information led to strategies such as 
underestimating domestic potentials for implementing a program, demands for 
excessive resources, falsifying statistics, and embellishing the real results of 
implementation--these strategies are more difficult to employ in the absence of 
central control. The modes of controlling behavior when power and information are 
decentralized are quite different, but the particular forms of control have not yet 
emerged. 
Taken together, these eight elements are the visible characteristics of the 
transformation process; notably that process results in massive changes in behavior. 
International environmental agreements are also intended to drive changes in behavior-- 
namely the behavior of individuals and enterprises that pollute or degrade the 
environment. The extent to which we assess an international environmental agreement as 
"effective" depends upon the ability of the agreement to change the relevant behavior. 
The research task is to describe all of these causes of change systematically so that the 
effects of transformation can be untangled from the effects (if any) of international 
environmental agreements. 
The process of transformation markedly changes the procedures and pathways by 
which an international environmental agreement might be implemented. Under the 
command system, implementation was entirely the province of the planning process, and 
implementation was fulfillment of a plan. Typically separate plans were not prepared for 
a particular international environmental agreement; rather, implementation was part of the 
normal planning of the economy, energy system, and society and, more recently, 
environmental plans. Because all aspects of the economy were planned, implementation 
required adjusting not only the behavior of polluters but all other linked aspects of 
economy, such as suppliers of fossil energy, pollution control equipment, and 
manufacturers of new technologies. The key feature of planning and implementation 
under a command system is that the chain of influence is very long--starting with an 
international environmental agreement, winding its way through the state, and ultimately 
affecting many dispersed units of the economy. 
Long chains impart many risks to implementation because failure at any link would 
result in implementation failure. The problem for implementation during transformation 
is in part that vestiges of the long implementation chains still remain in the economy--the 
economy dues not yet have the robust and self-correcting features of a functioning market 
yet also dues not have the power of central command. Implementation chains remain 
long and interconnected, and the links have weakened. This weakness is in addition to 
other challenges to implementation, such as lack of financial resources. 
However, the new Russian Constitution gives greater weight to international law 
than was true under the Soviet system, primarily because international law now has 
(within limits) direct applicability without legislation that "transforms" international norms 
into the domestic setting. Under the old system failure to implement international law in 
large measure stemmed from the (conscious) choice of simply not formulating the 
necessary transforming legislation. It is unclear whether the new Russian system or the 
old Soviet system results in generally more effective implementation. Under the new 
system international law has (on paper) greater weight but implementation chains are 
probably more fragile due to the collapse of central control and the still uneven 
decentralized administration that will replace command planning during the tranformation 
to a market economy. Under the old system, effective implementation was possible (and 
effective) when it fit with the interests of the Soviet state and ruling elite. 
These insights suggest four aspects of the transformation process that are of special 
importance to the effective implementation of international environmental agreements in 
economies undergoing transformation: 
1. Planning and programs. The fundamental shift in the development and 
implementation of policy is from central planning to a system of programs. 
Environmental "programs" consist of goals and incentives for behavioral change, 
but they differ fundamentally from planning in that they do not presume central 
control over behavior and information. How programs are actually translated into 
incentives for behavioral change remains thin in the Russian economy; yet this is the 
crucial precondition for allowing the market to adjust and yield outcomes that reflect 
social preferences. 
2. Property rights. When major polluters are no longer owned by the state the 
mechanisms of control must change. The state can control as regulator, where 
regulatory mechanisms exist, but no longer as sole owner. At times this regulatory 
role conflicts with other roles of the state, such as seller of an enterprise (where the 
goal is to get the highest price) or guarantor of low-cost services to consumers (who 
are also voters). The State still owns many of the largest polluters, but in practice 
authority is divided between many actors: the state, directors of an enterprise, local 
and regional authorities, and the workforce. Transformation is a mosaic of shifting 
property rights and control. None of the groups that have access to decision-making 
is also the clear owner of the enterprises. Opportunities for blocking decisions are 
many, and the incentives lead individuals to act in their own interest (which can 
vary markedly from the collective interest). One consequence of uncertainty and 
misplaced incentives is that aging anti-pollution equipment is not maintained or 
replaced; long-term investment is not favored. 
3. The State. The destruction of the old political and administrative system-- 
notably the removal of the Communist Party as a major organ engaged in 
implementation--has left a vacuum of traditional state authority. It is unclear if 
powerful environmental agencies and other governmental bodies--similar to those in 
many Western countries--will fill the gap. At present, the shift of power from the 
center to local authorities has scattered influence and authority into the countryside. 
The variance in local and regional responses to environmental issues will probably 
be high; the ability to implement coordinated nation-wide policy will be low. 
4. Bargaining. Transformation has practically eliminated direct control; elements 
of control that remain are dominated in many cases by bargaining. Uncertainty and 
change in the transformation process has led to a massive increase in bargaining at 
all stages of implementation. Thus the outcomes of implementation are more 
indeterminate than they were under the centralized system or than they will be under 
a functioning market system. Entire blocks of the state administration, property 
owners, and other stakeholders are constantly implementing their own interests, and 
bargaining reflects the incessant effort to seek and capture opportunities. 
Finally, the paper implies that the economic transformation has changed Russia's 
geopolitical interests and power, and that in turn affects how Russia behaves in 
international negotiations. On balance, transformation may make Russia (and especially 
the other former Soviet Republics) less arrogant and more realistic in international 
negotiations, including those concerning environmental matters, and may affect which 
types of international agreements Russia will ultimately implement and the reasons for 
Russian compliance. Further, transformation of the society--towards a free press and 
exchange of information--has made Russian society more transparent and it much less 
likely that purposeful concealment of failure to comply with international environmental 
obligations will be successful. 
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Many countries that have emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union now seek a 
transition to a democratic political system and a market economy. Some of them, and 
especially Russia, have started to carry out radical reforms. This transformation process will 
clearly have a significant impact on the implementation of international environmental 
commitments. The vast majority of international environmental regimes of which Russia is a 
member were initially created and implemented under political and economic conditions 
which have now changed fundamentally. The sheer scale of these changes does not allow us 
to ignore them. This transformation will take place over a long-term period. Geographically 
the area under transformation covers one-sixth of the world's temtory, and the environmental 
situation there might have an impact on neighbors and the global environmental context. In 
the midst of such a massive transformation it would seem that there is only modest room for 
theoretical and methodological concerns about implementation of international environmental 
agreements. However, this first impression is deceptive. Actually the range of problems that 
claim our interest, and the details of particular cases, have serious claims to theoretical 
research. 
In contrast to domestic policy research that has a mono-country character, in the case of 
international environmental regimes implementation takes place in several countries in a 
framework of several implementation mechanisms. International environmental regimes deal 
with one basic program (an international environmental agreement and its protocols) which is 
being performed simultaneously within several national implementing structures. The goals I 
envisaged by an international environmental agreement are common, but pathways to provide I 
this result are inevitably different across countries. The chosen instruments would be quite I I 
different, as would the initial problems to be solved (with the common features prescribed by 
the common international environmental agreement). The structures of implementors and 
addressees, the instruments chosen, their institutional organization, and the interactions 
between them would vary. 
i 
Uniformity and commonality are defined by the norms of a regime, and in particular by the 
targets and commitments of an agreement. But besides this uniformity the differences in 
national mechanisms of implementation are the subject of this research project. These 
differences may be increased by the process of transformation. Transformation radically 
changes those structures that condition how the regime is implemented in a country. 
Industrial, agricultural, and transport enterprises as polluters appear to be among the major 
targets (addressees) of environmental programs. Environmental programs elaborated 
especially for the purpose of changing the behavior of such targets does not occur in a 
vacuum, but in certain economic and political conditions. In order to take into account the 
effects of these factors the theory of implementation has introduced a notion of "situation" 
(Mayntz, 1980, 1983). The concept illustrates that the behavior of implementors and 
addressees is defined not only by a program designed to change the targets' behavior but also 
by factors exogenous to the program. This "situation" in which implementors and addressees 
function is not amorphous, but rather organized and structured, primarily by the type of 
economic and political system of the particular country. In relatively stable and highly 
independent countries (e.g., those of Western Europe) this factor might be disregarded to 
some degree because all enterprises and programs function in broadly the same economic 
and political framework. But in considering the implementation process in the states that are 
changing their systems, this feature might be of importance as a deteminant. Further, 
differences in the transformation may yield important differences in the "situation," and these 
in turn may yield important differences in the implementation of international environmental 
agreements, allowing informative comparisons and research results relevant to advising the 
process of transformation. 
I. REGIME AND A "BLACK BOX" 
If the student looks at the results of several dozen international environmental regimes 
currently in place, he will find that some of these are being implemented rather successfully, 
while others have become "dead letters" or "empty law". One explanation may lie in the 
agreements themselves. According to this point of view, everything depends on the quality 
of agreements and potentials of regimes based on them. 
In contrast, if the student studies regimes more closely, he may notice variations in the 
implementation of and compliance with the regime across different countries. "Good", or 
disciplined, member countries exist together with "bad" ones. What can be done in this 
situation to improve discipline under the regime? Regime-centered analysts advocate policies 
that adjust the regime to its relationship to the parties, for example: increase control and 
monitoring of compliance with an agreement, impose possible sanctions and pressures on 
violators, improve the work of a secretariat, etc. Certainly these measures are available, but 
the major problem is that while they are sometimes effective, in many cases they are not. 
A diametrically opposed approach is to seek explanations for regime effectiveness entirely at 
the domestic level. Noticing high variation in the behavior of member countries of a regime, 
a student might guess that the regime - or in particular international agreements - are unable 
to provide significant influence over its participants. And he proceeds from a notion that the 
domestic structures with which a regime interacts on a national level are so powerful that the 
signal of a regime's influence is very weak. Within the "black box" of domestic 
implementation the signal of a regime is absorbed and disappears. In this case the answer to 
the most important questions - how and why this happens - are not provided: the "black 
box" remains to be unpacked. And whether or not the goals declared by a regime are 
attained by a country is the result of unknown processes taking place within a "black box" 
full of puzzles and mysteries. 
Certainly in each of the two cases we are dealing with extremes: One is an overestimation 
of the possibilities of a regime, and the other an understatement of a regime's influence. 
However, as often happens, the extremes meet. These two different points of view have a 
common basis. They are rooted in an inadequately differentiated approach towards the 
implementation of regime on the most important stage that occurs after the formation of a 
regime. This problem is not well developed - and it reflects specific aspects of the whole 
body of literature dealing with the issue of implementation and effectiveness of international 
environmental regimes (e.g., Andresen et al., 1994; Levy et al., 1994). Only recently have 
analysts paid growing attention to this problem, trying to compensate for the lack of distinct 
notions about mechanisms of domestic implementation of international environmental 
regimes, about patterns of their interactions with diversity of forms of economic and political 
behavior on national arenas that form the context of implementation. The terminology used 
to define this important sphere of implementation - "situation", "structure", "black box", 
"exogenous variable", "x" - is further proof that for the description of this process symbols 
(that might be used also to define other objects, the essence of which is not clear for 
observers) are applied, rather than appropriate scientific terminology. However 
independently from the symbols in use, the essence of the problem is unchanged: the contents 
of the processes of domestic implementation are not clearly defined, and the "black box" 
remains unpacked. It is not difficult to see that the linkage between international and 
domestic regimes is part of a more general problem of an unpacked "black box" now at the 
frontier of political science research on domestic-international linkages (e.g. Evans et al., 
eds, 1993). The aim of the domestic implementation research conducted by the 
"Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments (IEC)" 
research project leads to the laborious work of unpacking this "black box". In particular, the 
research on the countries undergoing transformation will unpack the "black box" in that 
situation. 
"Black box" - implementation within a system? Broadly, the IEC project seeks to explain 
implementation of international environmental commitments, and to trace the factors related 
to their effectiveness. This part of the project deals with their domestic implementation in 1 
Russia as the country undergoes its transformation from one political and economic system to 
another. This process will be a protracted one by virtue of its complexity. Since 
implementation of international regimes is also a complex process defined by domestic 
economic, political and social factors, implementation of a regime in a country undergoing 
transformation obviously depends to a significant extent on the nature of that transformation 
process. 
Since transformation is a change in systems, the existence of linkage between regime and 
transformation becomes a compound of a more general question: to what extent is 
implementation of a regime interlinked with system frames? If the degree to which regime 
implementation is embedded into a system and its mechanisms is high, then inevitably the 
transformation of the system will strongly affect the regime. If such linkage is absent, then 
regime and transformation are not intertwined categories that must be studied together. 
Current research proceeds from the notion that there is a tight causal linkage between 
implementation of international environmental commitments and systems within which this 
implementation takes place, and therefore there is a causal linkage between a regime and 
transformation. It seems obvious that both theoretical and empirical proofs exist for this. 
Here we examine the concrete forms of such linkages in Russia today. 
II. TRANSFORMATION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR REGIMES? 
Transformation modifies the system frames in which the regime functions, and it creates new 
mechanisms and pathways for its implementation. The adjustment to new conditions is 
neither automatic nor painless. The problem of adjustment poses the question: how 
effectively are regimes implemented during and after the transformation? 
Here we examine the elements of the transformation and pose questions that arise from each 
of these elements. 
1. Changes in the nature of the actors. Some actors are disappearing completely as a 
result of the transformation process. The State Planning Committee in Russia, Gosplan, is 
one such example. Some of the actors have only recently appeared, such as enterprises 
under foreign ownership and foreign companies, which were sparse during the 70 years of 
Soviet rule. However, most actors are regenerating and changing, rather than being 
completely destroyed or born anew. The object that faces the process of transformation, 
does not disappear but rather changes its form radically. For example, a metallurgical plant 
- a severe environmental polluter, which formerly had been state property, currently is the 
private property of a single person or a group of shareholders, among them the state, or it is 
in joint ownership by its workers. The changes in the property rights result in changes of 
the rights of possession and the rights of disposition; both lead to changes in control over 
economic activity and resources and in turn to changes in the behavior of actors. The 
interests defined by the property rights and by their distribution among different groups of 
owners change considerably. 
Within the framework of this project we are also interested in the issue of how domestic 
implementation of the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) regime has been 
modified as a result of significant shifts in the property rights on a metallurgical plant, as 
well as on other enterprises that are sources of transboundary air pollution. What impact 
does this have on the domestic implementation and effectiveness of this international regime? 
What is the response of foreign enterprises to the signals and requests of international and 
national regimes? What is the level of the environmental technologies they bring to the 
Russian market? 
Changes in the nature of actors takes place not only in the case of enterprises. Actors 
represented by state and public organizations also change. For instance, green movement 
organizations that were marionettes under communism are now completely independent from 
the state and its ideology. The Russian Ministry of the Environment, established after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991, is guided in its activities by a completely new 
Environmental Law (1991). Media coverage of environmental issues has changed radically 
as the media have become independent from the state as well. Do these dramatic changes 
have any impact on domestic implementation of international environmental regimes? 
2. Changes in system linkages. In the course of transformation the interaction between 
actors changes radically. As with changes in actors, the transformation of system linkages is 
crucially important. In a totalitarian system, all these linkages are vertical: the command 
economy and society derives its directions from the top. In contrast, a market economy is 
characterized by horizontal linkages. These types of system linkages between various actors, 
functioning in the context of a linked system, might be regarded as channels through which 
the signals of international regimes reach their targets, but passing through many filters. 
Within a command system there was not, and could not be, any direct linkage between an 
international environmental regime and a polluter as a final target of the regime. (That does 
not mean, however, that no contacts existed, for instance, between the scholars of the 
national Academy of Sciences working in the natural reserves and representatives of 
international regimes.) Rather, all influence passed through the command of the center, 
which then issued commands to lower levels along a strictly structured chain. The major 
element in this chain was a governmental commission composed of representatives of the 
ministries directly responsible for ground-level implementation of commands received from 
the center. 
The transformation process has virtually destroyed the vertical system linkages, and resulted 
in serious changes in the system. Gosplan and sectoral ministries (major instruments in the 
execution of a plan) have been dismantled. Instead of a command economy, a market-based 
economy, where market linkages are dominant, is evolving. However, the practice of 
interdepartmental commissions responsible for regime implementation still exists. New 
institutions are not emerging onto an empty stage; rather, they incorporate the debris of the 
old ones. Today the institution of interdepartmental commissions functions with new 
members in their structure, and it functions under completely new system conditions. What 
remains of the old institution is largely a shell, since the chain of command on which it used 
to depend no longer exists and enterprises no longer implement orders from the center. 
What is the structure of the regime implementation chain under current conditions? What 
substitutes for command? In what cases is the command and rule preserved? How is 
command being executed in cases where vertical linkages still exist, and where it is not 
possible to cope without centralized control, even under market conditions? How does the 
interdepartmental commission responsible for international regime implementation function 
today? What are the interests of the organizations represented in it? What new organizations 
are involved at different stages of implementation? What is the role of the federal Ministry 
of Environment in this process, and what are its functions regarding the management of 
domestic implementation of international regimes? Does it have special bodies within its 
structure responsible for regime implementation? What other institutions are involved in 
regime implementation, and what is the division of functions between them? What role in 
the implementation process is played by the new legislative authorities in Russia? What are 
the approaches of the Russian parliament towards the ratification of new regimes? What is 
being done by its subsequent commissions? What is the role of new economic instruments in 
meeting the goals of international regimes? Do they function at all? What is the role of 
local authorities and local environmental management organs in the implementation process? 
What is the role of the newly created environmental funds? 
3. Changes in Interests. Political and economic transformation has created new interests as 
well. For the first time in Russian history the pursuit of internal interests of different actors 
has become legitimate. Under the command system there was, officially, only one category 
of legitimate interests, those of the state, although they in fact reflected the ambitions of a 
narrow group, the nomenclatura. Under transformation all actors are preoccupied primarily 
with revealing and expressing their own private interests. Under the market system broadly, 
the collective interest is presumed to be the aggregate of market exchanges by actors 
pursuing their private interests. Public and state interests are a consequence of competition-- 
the collision and exchange of separate private interests. Yet clean water and air are not 
goods created through the competition process. On the contrary, competition demands from 
economic subjects to reduce expenses, at times transferring ("externalizing") costs to nature, 
society, and the state. Thus one of the central problems relevant to regime implementation 
under transformation is who represents the collective interests of society within this new 
system, and how? 
What has been modified here in comparison with the former system of representation of 
interests? How are public environmental interests being shaped and represented? What 
potential conflicts might be associated with the development and expansion of public 
interests? What is the role of public organizations in maintaining these environmental 
interests? What is their attitude towards implementation of and compliance with international 
environmental accords by Russia? What are the major changes on this issue in comparison 
with the former system? To what extent is representation of environmental interests still 
monopolized by state institutions? What is the role of the recent weakening of the state 
authority as a major institution to protect nature? What is the impact of these processes on 
implementation of regimes? 
4. Changes in environmental priorities. Domestic interests that affect implementation may 
change, and so may interests in addressing and negotiating international agreements). 
Changes in the structure of interests during the transformation process may seriously affect 
how environmental issues rank on the scale of social priorities, and thus to a certain extent 
the formation of international environmental regimes. From the second half of the 1970s 
through the early 1980s, Soviet entry into international environmental regimes tended to be 
motivated not so much by the desire to solve environmental problems as by the pursuit of 
political goals. During the negotiations within the Helsinki process, particularly of 
environmental issues grouped within the second "basket", Soviet representatives made several 
concessions to compensate for the tough Soviet stand on human rights. Environmental issues 
ranked somewhere near the bottom of the government's agenda during this period, but they 
served as a useful trading chip in Soviet efforts to achieve overall security goals as well as 
recognition of East Germany and the postwar borders in Europe. As a result of 
transformation, the significance of environmental issues increased independently, and 
environmental goals were especially manifested under Gorbachev's perestroika. Many 
analysts have noted that in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, "environment" was one of 
the few areas of legitimate protest. The broader protests that ultimately led to revolutions 
and the collapse of the Cold War had strong roots in "environmental" interests. 
This phenomenon has a dual significance for our research agenda. First, a new category 
appears on the scene - a category of national environmental interests. This group of interests 
was not revealed within the command system because it was suppressed by other goals of 
international policies. What might be the impact of Russia's newly evolving national 
interests on the country's approach towards the entry into international environmental 
regimes? What is the content of its national environmental interests? How does the 
"external ecological balance" of Russia's inter-relation between export and import of 
pollutants) - a measure of vulnerability to transboundary environmental problems - compare 
with that of other countries? What are the attitudes within Russia itself towards 
environmental problems covered by a regime? These attitudes may be rather subjective, and 
they may depend on a subjective perception of national ecological interests, and on evaluation 
of the place of the country within the process of international environmental problem-solving. 
What environmental problems are considered of utmost importance today? 
A second aspect of this problem is the assessment of international environmental regimes 
already acting in Russia, but now under modified conditions caused by transformation. 
There may be changes in the approach to specific regimes that were signed by the USSR and 
inherited by Russia by virtue of its declaration of succession to Soviet international 
obligations. Which regimes still correspond with Russia's national interests? Which regimes 
are becoming "empty law" and "dead letters"? Do some remain relevant influences on 
behavior although they do not conform to the new interests of the country? I ! 
The significance of this problem might be better understood if one also takes into account the 
changes in the course of transformation in the geopolitical position of Russia as a participant 
in international regimes. The geography of the country has changed, as has its location 
among neighboring polluters. Prevailing western winds transport significant levels of air 
pollution to Russian territory from the Baltic republics, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, 
which did not exist as independent states when the LRTAP agreements were signed. 
Similarly, because of political reasons, air pollution originating in like-minded socialist bloc 
countries - primarily Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia - was previously considered 
more benign. 
Are the new states that have been established on the territory of the former Soviet Union 
members of environmental regimes? Have they signed and ratified the agreements? If so, 
how do they implement them? Is their signature just a formality, and is there a gap between 
their declarations and actions? These factors were introduced by the transformation process, 
and it seems that they might have a serious effect on the attitudes of Russia towards 
international environmental agreements. 
5. Larger roles for regions. As Russia moves from being a unitary to a federal state, the 
dismantling of the center's monopoly on the decision-making process has greatly increased 
the rights and powers of regional and local authorities. This development has led to high 
hopes among the public for improvements in carrying out environmental policies, now that 
regional and local authorities are directly dependent on the electorate and thus should have an 
incentive to influence governmental environmental protection policies. Whether this will in 
fact occur remains to be seen. Most likely the results will be very diverse, depending on the 
particular interests at stake and the expression of local government power. 
To what extent are regional and local authorities actually able, as a result of changes in their 
legal status following the adoption of a new constitution, to influence environmental policy? 
What is the impact of the sharp increase in the scope of local power on the implementation 
of international environmental agreements? What are the functions of the local authorities as 
regards regime implementation? Are they aware of international regime norms and rules? 
What are their attitudes towards a regime's provisions? What are the specific characteristics 
of their behavior in this respect? What new serious problems are associated with these 
changes? 
6. Changes in the nature of economic development. Transformation inevitably affects the 
process of economic development. When one system is being dismantled and others have not 
yet taken shape, the shock and instability of transformation oppressively affects economic 
development. This continues until stimulation from the new system is able to reverse the 
negative influences of shock, instability and change. 
Such a negative effect of transformation on economic development, although hopefully only 
transient, might be evident in all countries experiencing this process. However, this 
phenomenon is manifested most clearly in Russia. The sharp decrease in production, 
reductions in investment, the aging of technologies, and the dismantling of productive 
capacities are all abundant. 
What impact do these processes have on implementation and effectiveness of international 
environmental regimes? The decrease in production results in reductions of pollutant 
discharges. What is the effect of these processes on investments in environmental 
technologies and cleaner industries? What is their effect on attaining the goals of 
international regime? To what extent have the risks of technological catastrophes and 
breakdowns changed? What are the chances under these conditions for the installation of 
purification facilities by enterprises to meet norms of international regimes? What is the 
situation with the national scientific community, and how do these processes define changes 
in its impact on international environmental policy formation in the country? 
7. The role of the military complex. Under the command system the military appeared to 
be one of the major environmental polluters in the country. Its activities resulted in great 
environmental damage which often had a transboundary character. The military held an 
extremely powerful position which allowed virtually uncontrolled activity over huge 
territories. Wow we are aware that the military had freely violated the norms of some 
international environmental regimes when it was necessary for its purposes. 
What has changed under transformation in the behavior of the army in Russia regarding 
environmental issues? Does the military now more readily comply with the norms of 
international regimes? How are environmental control and monitoring being provided over 
territories under its "jurisdiction"? What is the role of regional control? What are the 
functions of the Ministry of Environment in this respect? Does the military still provide self- 
control as it was before? What will be the consequences of lifting (at least partially) the veil 
of secrecy that previously shrouded military activities? 
8. Behavior. Fundamentally we are trying to explain changes in behavior at the level of 
individuals and enterprises that are the causes of environmental problems. We are also 
interested in changes in the behavior of the state--the legitimate member of intergovernmental 
agreements--which is in part comprised of the behavior of individuals and enterprises but also 
includes the behavior of governmental actors such as bureaucrats who adjust incentives, 
promulgate laws, and file international reports. As noted elsewhere in the IEC project (e.g., 
Andresen et al., 1994; Levy et al., 1994), behavioral change is our measure of effectiveness. 
Later parts of this paper will examine in more detail the causal mechanisms that lead to 
behavioral change in the context of economic transformation, and the implications for 
research on this topic. Our basic intention is to identify which changes in behavior are due 
to the process of transformation and which reflect implementation of international 
environmental agreements. However, here we note a few aspects of behavioral change that 
are elements of the transformation process that will, in turn, affect the process of 
implementation. 
The operation of a totalitarian regime reinforces and selects certain behaviors, and thus the 
process of transformation may induce large behavioral changes as the old selection 
mechanisms are destroyed and replaced by new ones. Under a totalitarian regime and 
command-based economy, commands are provided only from the top level - from the center, 
and all other players in this process are just mute executives of these commands. All other 
forms of behavior are seen as undermining the basics of this system and must be instantly 
rejected and aborted by it. However, within the command system a set of forms of actors' 
behavior evolved, forms that externally conform fully to the system, and hence are non- 
punishable, but actually they appear to reflect and coincide with the interests of different 
actors, engaged in execution of commands from the center. 
The control of the command economy meant that it was possible to contemplate a variety of 
implementation strategies that would otherwise not be possible in a decentralized system. 
Thus it was (and is) particularly difficult to distinguish real behavioral change from what the 
command system ascribed as behavioral change. Typically, several options were available to 
central planners for domestic implementation of a regime, and optimal control required 
synergistic changes in many actors (e.g., ministries, enterprises, individuals). Control over 
information led to such strategies as underestimating domestic potentials for the 
implementation of a program, exaggerating the difficulties associated with its execution, 
demanding additional financial and material resources for this purpose, falsifying statistics, 
and embellishing the real results of implementation. 
The transformation process has broadened the number of forms of economic and political 
behavior. Today independent behavior is no longer a form of violating system rules, but can 
be regarded as one of the basic features of the new system. Transformation has created 
conditions when a dam curbing the pressures from different forms of behavior is collapsing. 
Without exaggeration it may be said of contemporary Russia that a flood of various possible 
forms of behavior, sometimes uncontrolled ones that ignore any restrictions, have 
overwhelmed the country. This has created a tremendous potential for initiative, which was 
strictly suppressed before, but has also bred many problems of chaos. 
What is the interrelation of this flow of new behavioral forms with the implementation of 
international environmental regimes? Does this flow aid or obstruct the implementation 
process? What are the most typical forms of behavior? Are international regimes able to 
restrain the behavior of certain actors and modify behavior in the necessary direction? Why 
and how are they able (or unable) to deal with this problem? 
As we have seen, there is a rather wide list of areas where transformation and regime are 
closely intertwined. It is easy to note that much is now in flux - not only the linkages 
between regime and transformation, but also deep interactions between regime and systems 
replacing each other. The analysis of these problems might serve as a basis for research 
design, but simultaneously it poses a broad range of further serious questions. These 
questions are not only numerous but also difficult to answer. That is why it is inevitable to 
explore the issue with the help of which scientific apparatus it is possible to deal with these 
problems, and what research instruments might be used for this purpose. 
Regime's phase and system's sphere. It may prove helpful to systematic analysis to 
distinguish phases in a regime's implementation. The process of implementation passes from 
one sphere of social organization into another. We identify six phases, starting from the 
moment when environmental problem emerges: 
1) phase of scientific realization of a problem; 
2) phase of social and political formation of ecological interests, including their realization 
as a part of national, international or global ones; 
3) phase of regime formation; 
4) phase of performing a regime via state institutions, as well as via non-governmental 
structures; 
5) phase of implementation of a regime by targets - polluting enterprises and consumers; 
6) phase of control over the results of regime functioning, of enforcement, and learning 
lessons from its experience. 
In the awareness that there might be other schemes of gradation, let's look at the latter one 
as corresponding profoundly to the set of tasks before our analysis. Movement of the 
implementation process along certain phases allows to indicate that each of them is 
characterized by its own specifics. Differences between phases are of principal character. 
Each time moving through its separate stages the implementation process passes through a 
certain "environment" -since each time this is a particular sphere of a system, where its own 
type of actors function, as well as rules of behavior and its own language prevail. 
The first phase is primarily conducted within science, and scientists are the major actors 
here. The number of actors is relatively small. The discussion is framed mainly in scientific 
terminology, and the major result is scientific formulation of the environmental problem. 
The second ~ h a s e  has its basis in the formulation of responses to solve an environmental 
problem. The major actors here might be public organizations, the green movement, various 
political parties, and policy-makers. The actors' behavior is defined mainly by the rules of 
political behavior. The problem that was formulated earlier in scientific terms becomes a 
policy problem, which is the major result of this phase. It acquires social and political status 
within society's agenda. National ecological interests are formed, sometimes including 
formulation of environmental doctrine. One of the major results in this phase is perception 
of the fact that joint international actions of a group of countries are needed to solve this 
environmental problem. 
The third phase results in formation of an international environmental regime to solve this 
environmental problem - its norms, rules, procedures and institutions. The major actors are 
the governments of member states, governmental officials and bureaucracies, and 
representatives of international organizations. Major interests are national ecological 
interests but united by a common desire to achieve a solution to the international 
environmental problem. Interstate conflicts are blunted by this common interest. The 
behavior of actors is described mainly in terms of political behavior, and problems under 
consideration are mainly in the terminology of international law and political science. 
Under the fourth ~ h a s e  the transplantation of norms and rules of an international 
environmental regime into a domestic implementation mechanism takes place. Re-coding of 
the signals from the international regime into signals that match the "system" (within which 
implementation takes place) occurs in a manner that is available and easy for actors to 
comprehend and execute. This is achieved through the transformation and reformulating of 
the regime's norms either into a command or into the signals that result in shifts in the 
economic function of polluting enterprises. The major actors in this scene under the 
command-based system are planners, governmental officials. In a market and democratic 
system they are joined by various non-governmental organizations which attempt to influence 
the polluters' behavior. The actors' behavior is defined mainly by the rules of bureaucratic 
behavior, modified according to one system or another. As a whole this phase serves as a 
"transmission" between a regime and polluters. The analysis of the processes in this phase is 
being held in the terminology of the theory of economic systems, theory of political systems, 
and bureaucratic behavior. 
The fifth uhase is decisive in the process of implementation. Independent of the quality of a 
regime, its institutional organization, and the functioning of governmental mechanisms, the 
ultimate success of a regime depends on the actors' behavior in the economic sphere. The 
final results of the whole implementation process depends on what polluting enterprises 
actually do, how and to what extent they are influenced by the regime's signals, which reach 
them through long and intricate channels of influence and communication. The major actors 
on this scene are polluting enterprises and consumers. The number of actors varies 
considerably across particular regimes, but in some regimes it is especially high. 
Environmental behavior of actors is defined by the rules of system economic behavior. The 
regime is able to introduce certain modifications and corrections into it, transforming 
behavior in a way necessary for the regime to function. But for this purpose the regime has 
to use adequate methods and postulates. The major result of this phase might be pollution 
reductions due to changes in the environmental behavior of actors. The processes of regime 
implementation in this phase are described in the terminology of the theory of economic 
systems and the theory of economic behavior. 
The sixth phase represents elements from different spheres. The major actors here are 
monitoring organs, governmental bureaucrats from different levels, regime secretariats, 
courts and inspectors in member countries, mass media, etc. Despite a complicated 
composition of actors, the procedures for sanctions enforcement in case of violation of 
regime rules, which are applied towards polluters on national level, illustrate rather clearly 
the embeddedness of this phase into system frames. The application of sanctions outside the 
rules of the system is not workable. For instance, the system of charges within the 
command-based economy is totally inefficient - it implies simple reallocation of resources 
from one governmental pocket into another (losses of states enterprises under the command 
economy were instantly covered by donations from a budget). This phase in general 
provides rather important functions of inverted linkages. 
The analysis across phases of implementation proves the assumption introduced earlier that 
the implementation process is tightly interlinked with those economic and political systems 
within which it occurs. Only two out of the six phases - that of science and of regime 
formation - might be more or less independent of the system. The remaining four phases of 
implementation are intensively intertwined with the system environment. 
N. REGIME AND SYSTEM: CHARACTER OF LINKAGES 
The theory of economic systems distinguishes two types of systems--ideal and real. The 
"market economy" and "command economy" are types of ideal economic systems. Each is 
characterized by basic, constitutional elements: allocation of resources and system linkages, 
property rights, character of stimuli and sanctions, and financial system. These are the 
major blocks of an economic system, and they constitute its foundation. If these elements 
are transformed, then a change from one system to another occurs, i.e., its transformation. 
In practice, ideal types are modified by many other elements. At the level of concrete 
countries, economic systems function in different ways and constitutional elements are 
supplemented by additional elements. Both of them shape real economic systems and 
behavior. For example, among these additional elements might be national public mentality, 
including people's relationship to nature, people's legal obedience and aspiration towards 
order, or on the contrary lack of discipline and inclinations to anarchy, peculiarities of labor 
recruitment in a country (e.g., recruitment for one's whole life in Japan), the scales of a state 
sector (e.g., high in Italy and Austria), the character of state regulations of a market (e.g., 
specialized banks in the USA and universal ones in Germany), and many others. In the 
environmental sphere they might include, for instance, the presence or absence of specialized 
governmental organs responsible for environmental protection, their place within a 
governmental structure, the rank of environmental protection within the scale of social 
priorities, etc. All these elements taken together constitute the real system, which functions 
on a national level. A notion of "system" usually envisages its ideal type, and those 
combinations of constitutional elements which form either a market or a command system. 
The transformation underway in Russia involves the replacement of the major constitutional 
elements of one (ideal) type of an economic system by another. Yet many elements that 
shape (in addition to constitutional elements) the real type of the system in Russia remain 
unchanged (they are defined by national, geographical, and other characteristics of a system). 
In this case the country's peculiarities remain a constant, but a system undergoes massive 
~ 
transformation. I 
Regime and transformation. There is a certain nuance that should not disappear when one 
poses a question about a linkage between regime and transformation. Most regime analysis 
assumes that a certain polluting country exists, the regime is introduced, and the regime then 
introduces a certain order. This legitimate assumption logically leads to the questions: what 
effect has the regime produced, what has the regime altered, and what has the regime 
affected? 
The context for regime research during the process of transformation is quite different. A 
regime might already exist for a certain period of time in a country under transformation. 
The changes observed are not due to the introduction of a regime, but rather due to the onset 
of system transformation. History seems to stage its unique experiment specially for students 
involved in the analysis of international regimes. It has turned a constant that has been in 
existence for seventy years into a variable. While real systems are subjected to constant 
marginal changes over time, economic systems in their ideal type usually remain unchanged 
during the life-cycle of certain international regimes. A market system in the West has 
existed for several centuries and is reasonably treated as a constant. System transformation 
is a rather unique phenomenon in history, especially in the history of international regimes 
(and particularly regimes concerned with environmental protection). However, 
transformation provides an opportunity to expose the problem of regime implementation 
somehow from the other end: it makes it possible to approach the issue by evaluating the 
impact of a system change on regime implementation and effectiveness. 
Regime and system. An economic system in its ideal type is exogenous, independent of any 
given international regime. The international regime is not able to change the constitutional 
principles of the national system. Implementation of regimes in the USSR did not mean to 
modify the system of centralized planning and state property. It only meant to transplant the 
norms of international regimes into the system of planning that served as the basis for the 
whole implementation mechanism of the command economy. The "object" to be transplanted 
from a regime into a domestic system should have a certain shape in order not to be rejected 
by the economic and political systems of a country implementing the regime, but in practice 
there is usually considerable flexibility in the interpretation and implementation of 
international commitments. If signals from a regime were able to find a proper place in the 
appropriate cells of a system, then implementation was able to develop without any serious 
problems. It was so in the case of the norms established by international regimes because 
norms in their essence do not contradict the principles of command system. Regime norms 
either substituted for existing national norms, or were placed within cells where the meaning 
of a norm was insignificant. Thus international norms of a regime are transplanted into a 
domestic system and are able to change the behavior of polluters. In practice, polluters often 
may not even have been aware that these established norms reflected international law. They 
were not very much interested in the international context because, e.g., financing for the 
installation of purification equipment was provided by domestic financial institutions, and all 
relevant incentives were executed at the domestic, not international, level. 
The following question might be posed: can a regime modify a system by changing the 
behavior of its targets, and by being incorporated into domestic practice? We do not have a 
definite answer about the effect of Helsinki process on the Soviet political system 
modifications, but regarding the changes in behavior of economic actors, the answer might 
be: a regime's norm is not able to change the basic type of behavior in a system. In a 
market economy the system's behavior is aimed at maximizing income (or maximizing 
turnover); in a command economy the system vigorously pushes enterprises to fulfill a plan. 
Thus the incorporation of an international environmental norm must be based on the 
respective forms of behavior. In a market economy environmental norms might result in 
shifts in the economic and productive functions of an enterprise; in a command economy the 
norm should be incorporated into a structure of the enterprise's plan targets. In both cases a 
certain modification of economic behavior takes place, but only on the basis of system forms 
of behavior, and without changing the fundamental nature of the system. A regime does not 
change the constitutional principles of a system if we bear in mind a system of an ideal type, 
but it transplants its norms and rules within frames defined by a system. Without changing a 
system type a regime interacts with a system by changing its periphery, i.e., elements of real 
type of a system. 
V. EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANSFORMATION 
Transformation obviously affects the pathways of regime implementation, but how does it 
influence the effectiveness of a regime? 
Inevitability of a variety of effectiveness indicators. Measures of effectiveness might take 
several forms: the extent to which an environmental problem is solved, goal attainment, 
fulfillment of an agreement, or changes in behavior (Young and Levy, 1995). 
The multiplicity of indicators emerges from the nature of the implementation process - 
different indicators refer to different stages of the process. The indicator of problem-solving 
reflects the full cycle of implementation, incorporating the maximum number of phases. 
From the point of view of scientists formulating an environmental problem this indicator 
would probably be the most important. In contrast, the indicator of goal attainment reflects 
the effectiveness issue more narrowly - it incorporates fewer phases, and is probably most 
relevant for policy planners and analysts. 
Some analysts have compared and assessed the merits of different indicators (Young, 1994, 
ch.6; Levy et al., 1994). Among the most vividly discussed is an indicator of environmental 
problem-solving, and that its major shortcoming is the difficulty of its measurement. 
In order to illustrate shifts in the effectiveness of a regime during the process of 
transformation, it seems reasonable to base an analysis on its several indicators. The 
indicator of "problem-solving" may play a broad role. However, transformation may result 
in considerable changes in societal perceptions. The "problem-solving" indicator depends on 
the problem to be solved, and thus the social perception of which problems are most 
important. Changes in social perception may even create doubts as to whether a country 
should participate in a regime. 
The behavioral change indicator for describing the effectiveness of an international regime in 
a country under transformation is also important. Actors' behavior and changes in it define 
an implementation process practically in all its phases. The economic and political behavior 
of actors considerably modifies the pathways of implementation. It might speed up its 
movement towards the solving of a problem, goal attainment, and executing regime norms 
and provisions, but also might prevent and detain it, and even might become a totally 
insurmountable obstacle to regime implementation. 
Further, the "goal attainment" indicator raises many important research questions. If 
realization of a program, a norm or a law is considered the major task of the implementation 
process, then naturally the analysis should focus on the reasons for the gaps between norms 
and goals formulated by a program and its actual results. The behavior of actors in this 
context plays a dual role. Since the central goal of a regime is to change the behavior of 
polluters, they are the major targets of environmental programs. Success or failure of regime 
implementation depends on these changes. 
Treaty and non-treaty induced changes. One of the serious research problems before us is 
that transformation also modifies the forms of economic and ecological behavior. During 
such rapid changes, how can we distinguish the changes in actors' behavior that are caused 
by implementation of a regime from the changes associated with the shift in a type of 
system? In other words, we have two categories of behavioral change in the economy: one 
due to changes in the system, and the other due to influence of international regimes. 
The chain of implementation is rather long. As the signal from an international regime 
moves towards its target it is subjected to many different forces and distortions. Extraneous 
influences begin at the stage of translating an ecological problem from its scientific 
foundations into its social and policy perceptions. The process is marked by pervasive 
bargaining and political games and efforts to gain political advantage. Many actors 
participate, including policy-makers and representatives of influential economic groups 
(including those responsible for environmental pollution). Thus political and economic 
interests enter the scene. The problem acquires the structure of interests of the particular 
actors - ministries, industrial groups, parties and movements - who formulate national 
environmental doctrine and national environmental programs. In the next phase - the phase 
of regime formation - the initial contours of the environmental problem might be altered even 
further. Conflict and compromise continually shape the policy outcomes and perceptions of 
the environmental problem. 
However, the most significant distortions and deviations from the initial formulation of the 
environmental program and methods to execute it, occur at a later stage after the signing and 
ratification of an agreement - when the governmental apparatus enters the scene to implement 
an agreement. The regime must be implemented in the context of the existing national I 
situation, and in doing so the signals from the international one are brought to the targets. I 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF REGIME IN A COMMAND SYSTEM 
One's attitude to the operation of the command system might be quite negative, and it 
deserves it, but this should not be a cause for disregarding the options it opens for research, 
including research on implementation of international environmental regimes. 
Implementation as fuIf^fent  of a plan. Implementation represents a process of realization 
of plans, including those that replace market mechanisms of coordination. All aspects of 
implementation - major implementation institutions, financial funds allocated for these 
purposes, implementors and addressees, etc. - are embraced by the plan, or at least should 
ideally be incorporated into it. Implementation within a centrally planned system also occurs 
in the context of a broader plan that governs all economic activity. Domestic implementation 
of an international environmental agreement might take the form of a specialized item on 
Both elaboration and execution of environmental programs in the framework of a centrally 
planned system take place mainly within the planning process. Environmental planning is a 
compound of a whole process of economic and social planning. Planning of a program 
incorporates not only its elaboration and substantiation, the fixing of goals, and collection of 
the necessary data, but also promoting its realization and control over its execution, thus 
including the most important elements of its implementation process. (For more details on 
scientific discussion on problems of implementation of international agreements in the Soviet 
Union, see Nikitina, 1994) 
The forms of environmental planning. Environmental programs of centrally planned 
economies take many different forms: 
- planning of environmental protection within short-term, annual, and five-year economic 
plans; 
- environmental plans of industrial enterprises, their groups or whole branches of 
industry; 
- regional and territorial environmental plans; 
- plans in certain spheres of environmental protection. 
Environmental plans are not autonomous. Rather, many plans are simultaneously shaped by 
the central planning organ; together they make up the national economic plan. Similarly, the 
mechanism of implementation of environmental plans is also not independent. As a result, 
the success or failure of the domestic implementation of an international environmental 
agreement (as well as of national environmental plans generally) depends largely on the 
implementation of plans within the planning system, not only within the circumscribed area 
of environmental planning. Plans from different spheres overlap. 
If an international environmental agreement envisages certain reduction norms for discharges 
of pollutants in its member countries, then this norm will be incorporated by national 
directive organs into a five-year plan and subjected to execution. The plan must also foresee 
methods for achieving this task. If a plan assumes that emission reductions would be 
provided by the installation of purification facilities at the polluting enterprises, then in the 
centrally planned system it is not sufficient to allocate financial funds for these purposes. 
First of all, central planning organs have to plan the production of the needed purification 
equipment at machine-building enterprises, and envisage and fix subsequent deliveries of 
energy and labor resources, materials and equipment parts (metal, engines, filters, etc.). 
Thus compliance with the international norm would depend on accomplishing the planned 
targets along the whole technological chain. In this case it would not be limited at all by a 
short cycle: 
International National Polluting 
environmental ----- > environmental ----- > enterprises 
agreement norm that has 
accumulated 
international norms 
Rather, the cycle would be much longer. Ratification of an agreement here might be a 
formality, since the center has already undertaken a decision to sign it. The whole legal 
framework might also represent a rather formal procedure. But the actions of incorporating 
a regime's norms into indicators of a plan, and providing financial and material resources for 
this process, would actually be the major ones in a process of regime implementation. This 
longer cycle would include: 
1 2 3 
International National Polluting 
environmental ----- > environmental ----- > enterprise 
agreement plan as a part 
of national 
economic plan 
4 5 6 
Producer of ------ > Suppliers of: ------ > Suppliers of: 
purification - Metal - Energy 
equipment - Engines - Coal 
- Filters - Copper, etc. 
Long chains and the risks in the implementation process. If execution of one of the plans 
for a single enterprise within this long chain is violated, non-compliance with the provisions 
of international environmental agreement might result. Meeting the goal would be shifted to 
the following year and the entire mechanism would be enacted once again, and so on. (The 
fragility of compliance where implementation occurs in long chains to some degree has been 
counter-balanced by the totalitarian power that has accompanied the command system.) 
This brief theoretical analysis of the implementation process the within command system 
leads us to some practical conclusions. Longer technological chains of implementation 
increase the risks of non-compliance with an international environmental agreement in a 
centrally planned economy. We therefore have to analyze environmental agreements from 
this standpoint, and to compare cases characterized by long and short chains - by higher or 
lower risks of (involuntarily) defecting from an agreement. Perhaps with this purpose in 
mind it would be possible to develop new approaches to the content of international 
obligations of the countries undergoing transformation and with centrally-planed economies 
towards environmental agreements that seek to influence these groups of countries, as well as 
to the issue of control over their compliance. Currently there is an impression that the 
application of equal treaty norms to different economic and political systems results in low 
effectiveness of international environmental agreements in the group of countries with 
centrally planned and economies under transformation, 
The problem of implementation in a command system. The example of the USSR showed 
that there was no deficit in the number of environmental plans adopted. Nor would it be an 
exaggeration to say that the country ranked far ahead of all the industrial nations taken 
together in terms of the sheer number of such programs. For instance, programs in the 
sphere of water resources protection and conservation were adopted in 1960, 1967, 1969, 
1970, 1972, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, and so on. They were coordinated and issued jointly 
by the USSR Council of Ministries and the Central Committee of the Communist party. The 
enormous number of programs and governmental resolutions issued is rather puzzling. It 
indicates that the elaboration and adoption of programs even at the highest levels does not 
guarantee problem-solving in a centrally planned system. On the contrary, it was an 
indicator that implementation is the weakest element in this whole cycle. 
This is true not only of the execution of environmental programs but also of the entire 
implementation process in the economy and its role under a totalitarian system in general. 
None of the five-year plans adopted in the USSR was ever completely fulfilled. The goals of 
the great policy and economic programs - building communism, providing the population 
with food and housing - were proclaimed over and over again but never achieved. While 
some plans were implemented and their targets even exceeded, the majority of these were in 
the military sphere, not within conventional human activities. The failures in implementation 
became a tragedy of the system. The shortcomings of the implementation mechanism in 
general in the command system defined its failure and led to its decay. The phenomenon of 
chronic non-compliance with environmental plans in a command economy constitutes one of 
the basic items within the whole problem of implementation. 
The new Russian Constitution gives greater weight to international law than was true under 
the Soviet system, primarily because international law now has (within limits) direct 
applicability without legislation that "transforms" international norms into the domestic 
setting. Under the old system failure to implement international law in large measure 
stemmed from the (conscious) choice of simply not formulating the necessary transforming 
legislation (see generally Danilenko, 1994). 
In sum, it is unclear whether the new Russian system or the old Soviet system results in 
generally more effective implementation. This is one of the issues we seek to explore within 
the IEC project. Under the new system international law has (on paper) greater weight but 
implementation chains are probably more fragile due to the collapse of central control and 
the still uneven decentralized administration that will replace command planning during the 
transformation to a market economy. Under the old system, effective implementation was 
possible (and effective) when it fit with the interests of the Soviet state and ruling elite. 
VII. REGIME DURING THE PERIOD OF TRANSFORMATION 
1. Planning and Programs 
While a number of the newly independent Soviet republics have preserved the system of a 
command economy and centralized planning, others have embarked on market reforms. 
Central planning no longer functions in these "transformation" countries. Instead of 
environmental planning, environmental programs are being introduced. 
The primacy of planning in the centrally planned system reflects the fact that, in order to 
achieve behavioral change, central planners must know in detail what they want to do, and 
how the disparate parts of the economic system fit together. The plan is the organization and 
adjustment of the economy. In contrast, market systems are decentralized, and thus policy 
implementation does not take the form of plans but rather policy programs. The difference 
between plans and programs is the specificity of direction (and outputs) and instruments of 
control. Plans direct all relevant economic activity while policy programs are aimed at that 
activity, leaving the market to adjust to the rest and to coordinate separate microeconomic 
programs of producers within the economic system. Policy programs are not created without 
"planning", but the process of preparing for the future need not result in a detailed connected 
matrix of economic activity. Primarily, programs handle incomplete information more easily 
than do systems that require a full plan. 
During a period of transformation some very important questions arise: 
1) Environmental plans are replaced by environmental programs - what changes in 
their internal contents have resulted? What are the changes in the mechanism of 
implementation of international environmental agreements? Which elements of the old 
system of planning are inherited by the new one? 
2) In the absence of a centralized economic plan, how does integration of 
environmental norms from international environmental agreements take place? 
3) During the transformation process environmental programs still act in conditions of 
a poorly developed market. What implications does this have for implementation of 
international environmental agreements? 
4) Elements of environmental planning also exist within market economies, notably in 
the form of environmental reductions in industrial countries. To what degree are the lessons 
drawn from those examples relevant to economies undergoing transformation - which also are 
characterized by a mix of market and command systems? 
2. Property Rights 
Changes in property rights also directly affect the behavior of polluters. Under the command 
system the major polluting enterprises were owned by the state. Once the state undertook 
obligations under international environmental agreements, it influenced state-owned producers 
to make them comply with international norms. With the transformation process the situation 
has changed radically. Many polluting enterprises are now in private ownership (as either 
newly created or privatized businesses). Thus the old forms of implementation no longer 
apply. To influence the behavior of this group of addressees the state has to find new 
instruments and mechanisms, but it has no experience in their effective application yet. 
Nonetheless, a significant number of enterprises are still state-owned, and most of these are 
among the country's major polluters - large energy-producers as well as metallurgical, 
chemical and mining enterprises. Property rights in the transformation period have acquired 
some specifics for state-owned enterprises. Although the state has formally preserved its 
ownership, it has lost much of its former ability to control its own enterprises. In place of 
the state, three major groups have increased their influence during the transformation period: 
1) directors of enterprises and their administration; 2) local and regional authorities; 3) the 
workforce. 
The situation with property rights is very complicated. In addition to the internal 
contradictions between these three groups, they also struggle with the ministerial 
bureaucracies over disposition of property rights (e.g., privatization of industry). 
Contradiction and struggle are manifested in many ways. First, certain groups of actors 
might block the decisions of others; this occurs above all between enterprise administrators 
and local authorities. Second, none of the groups that have access to the decision-making 
process is at the same time the clear owner of these enterprises. As a result, each group 
maximizes its current income from the operations of an enterprise (converting even amortised 
deductions into income), rather than increasing the enterprise's collective welfare. Third, in 
contrast to the market model, where the behavior of managers is strongly controlled by an 
owner or shareholders, in the transformation period control by the state (i.e, owners) is 
practically absent. The state behaves only as quasi-owner. Ambiguity in the distribution of 
and control over property rights has a rather negative impact on the implementation of an 
international regime. Without ownership and without actual control by the owner, the 
directors of state enterprises virtually avoid all investment. Aging equipment is not renewed; 
new purification facilities are not installed. 
From this analysis it is clear that solving environmental problems is inextricably linked to 
solving the problems of transformation as well as to the progress of economic reforms. Thus 
the international community may be directly interested in sorting out the issue of property 
rights during the transformation period in Russia for many reasons. A great deal depends on 
the progress of these reforms - not least the environmental security of both the East and the 
West, including implementation of international regimes. 
3. The State 
The political system plays an important role in all types of implementation. In the Soviet 
command economy the greater part of economic commands and directives were provided via 
political channels. Communist party organs on different levels played the role of main 
implementors. Adoption of an environmental program or entry into an international 
environmental agreement was not possible without a special resolution of the Politburo or the 
Central Committee of the Communist party. 
Formerly environmental policy was devised by the center with little regard for regional and 
local interests. Now the situation has changed considerably. Have any improvements in 
environmental protection occurred since the shifting of authority from the center to the local 
level? 
The problem of implementation of international regimes via mechanisms of a political system 
is very important in the transformation period. Much of the old political system was 
destroyed. In Russia the old political and administrative system was dismantled in such a 
way that simultaneously the major state authority structures were ruined as well, resulting in 
a deficit of state authority. The weakening of the state naturally has an impact on 
implementation of environmental programs, including international environmental regimes. 
Implementing organs, including their functions and structure, have also been modified during 
transformation. Is it possible to assess a linkage between environmental degradation during 
transformation and the extreme weakening of a state authority? Or probably the contrary - is 
this degradation associated with the compt apparatus exploiting the environment by the use 
of state authority? What are the attitudes and interests of old and new nomenclarura groups 
towards environmental protection issues? Are there any channels to influence their behavior? 
To what degree does the new federal environmental ministry have real authority, and what is 
its position within the power structure in general? How does it interact with regional and 
local authorities? Does it have any real instruments of support for and control over 
implementation of environmental programs? 
4. Bargaining 
The process of transformation has markedly increased the role of bargaining. One of the 
reasons for the increase in bargaining is that under a weak state authority the command 
method does not work adequately within the administrative structure itself. Entire blocks of 
the state administration are engaged in implementing their own interests, and bargaining 
reflects the constant effort to seek and capture opportunities. 
Bargaining occurs not only in market and democratic systems but also in centrally planned 
systems. Private interests cannot be eradicated, and communist systems are incapable of 
suppressing them entirely. However, they are realized in rather specific forms. In a 
centrally planned system some ministries participate in and dominate the bargaining over 
allocation of governmental resources. In a centrally planned system that is characterized by 
a deficit of everything, the objects of the bargaining were material and financial resources. 
Each ministry and region tries to maximize its share. This ministerial competition for 
resources affects the execution of all programs and plans. As for environmental programs, 
they have never been "fortunate", since environmental institutions do not play leading roles 
in the ministerial competition. 
Further, neither the public nor state protection organs were able to control the army's 
behavior towards the environment. Under a veil of secrecy it turned into a major polluter. 
What has been changed during transformation? What mechanisms could be used to make the 
army comply with environmental norms and programs? 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Let's enumerate the major conclusions from our analysis: 
Transformation - the shift from one type of economic and political system to another has 
resulted in a serious upheaval of social structures in many countries. Perhaps one-fifth of 
world territory is now under transformation. As a result, the conditions under which 
international environmental regimes function have changed radically. Inevitably this raises 
the question of whether regimes function effectively during transformation. 
Neither the "regime-centrist" nor the "black box" approach allows full analysis of the 
problem of the transformation's effect on international environmental regimes. Unpacking the 
"black box" - domestic politics - appears to be a prerequisite for solving this problem. 
The process of implementation occurs in many phases. The studies of labyrinths of a "black 
box" might be staged according to by-phases analysis of the implementation process. Several 
different spheres of societal organization are involved in that process. At the same time all 
these spheres are interlinked and combined into a unified economic and political system. In 
this way implementation is closely connected with the system framework. 
Linkages between the international regime and the domestic system exist in several degrees 
of intensity. The embeddedness of a regime in a system can be empirically described. The 
extent of embeddedness is characterized particularly by the number of polluting enterprises 
involved into the sphere of the regime's impact, by the character and scales of environmental 
financing to provide its functioning on a domestic level, etc. i 
Within the implementation process international regimes are closely connected with the 
economic and political system of the country where their implementation takes place. 
Implementation of international environmental regimes occurs with the help of the 
transplantation of their norms and rules into a new environment, where its system rules act. 
A regime's norms do not act directly, but rather must be built into the indigenous 
institutional mechanism. 
Certain linkages and interactions exist between a regime and a national system. The regime is 
not able to change the basic constitutional elements of a system. Its norms and rules have to 
be placed either in the spare cells of a system, or have to correct and modify existing norms. 
Polluting enterprises and consumers are among the final targets of a regime. Only as a result 
of changes in their behavior is it possible to reduce the anthropogenic pressures on the 
environment as envisaged by a regime. Polluters function in the economic sphere, and their 
anti-ecological behavior is an element of economic behavior. The goal of the regime is to 
modify this behavior. By affecting the incentives and calculations of economic units, the 
regime alters their behavior. Tracing and explaining changes in the economic behavior of 
polluters is one of the important items of our research. The analysis of deviations in the 
economic behavior of polluters from the standard norms of economic behavior in the course 
of implementation of an international agreement is necessary for evaluation of the 
agreement's influence on behavior (i.e. its effectiveness). The links between the norms of a 
regime and behavioral change of polluters can be long. The transmission of influence from 
the international regime to locality can be influenced by many factors - it is neither direct nor 
neutral. For instance, the behavior of bureaucracies significantly affects the trend in 
implementation of a regime. 
Phase-by-phase analysis of the implementation process indicates that it develops via different 
spheres of economic and political organization. The functioning of each of these spheres is 
described by specially developed disciplines with their own terminology. It is impossible to 
move forward in deep analysis of international environmental regimes implementation 
without their help. Under these conditions the role of implementation theory and its 
terminology may be regarded as a unifying instrument in this type of analysis, which 
comprises all stages of this multidisciplinary research. 
Under transformation the question of interactions between a regime and the structures that 
surround it on a national level may be put a bit differently. Under ordinary conditions an 
international environmental agreement and the international regime based on it "arrive" at a 
member country and result in certain effects. Under transformation the whole situation is 
quite different. In a country where dozens of regimes already function, transformation 
"arrives". The systems are under change and the structures with which the regimes have 
interacted are radically modified. 
Transformation has resulted in changes to a series of major institutions without which 
implementation of a regime is impossible. These include property rights, system linkages, 
state structures, and the division of authority between the federal and local level. We 
envisage analyzing all these forms of special interactions. The selection of specific 
environmental cases is under way, and one of the main criteria being used is a tightness of 
linkages between a regime and the transformation process. 
Empirical analysis is supposed to return regularly to theoretical constructions and 
methodological instruments of analysis, the basics of which have already been elaborated, in 
order to constantly improve them. We intend to focus on further dividing the phases of 
implementation process into stages, as well as on elaborating possible forms of economic and 
ecological behavior and deviations from these, which occur inter alia under the impact of an 
international environmental regime. 
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